Court: United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Plaintiff Bruce K. Wright and per quod plaintiff Louise K. Wright allege Mr. Wright had asbestos exposure from working as a mechanic at multiple shops from approximately 1969 to 2013.
Plaintiffs specifically claim that Mr. Wright had exposure while working as a mechanic with asbestos-containing brakes, gaskets and clutches and/or otherwise servicing heavy trucks manufactured by defendant Mack Trucks Inc. during his employment with Package Industries from approximately 1986 to 1987, as well as A.J. Letourneau Trucking from 1990 to 1994, Mobile Maintenance from 1993 to 1994, and Lily Transportation from 1996 to 1998.
Plaintiffs further allege Mr. Wright’s asbestos exposure caused him to be diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in November 2022. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, failure to warn and defective design and loss of consortium claims, against Mack. On November 22, 2024, Mack filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims alleged by plaintiff upon the conclusion of discovery.
Mack’s argument that it was entitled to summary judgment was two-fold: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to prove that exposure to asbestos-containing components within Mack’s trucks caused Mr. Wright’s mesothelioma and therefore dismissal of the negligence, breach of express and implied warranty claim, and failure to warn and defective design claims, is therefore warranted as a matter of law; and (2) Mrs. Wright’s loss of consortium claim must fail because Mr. Wright’s personal injury claims fail against Mack as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ opposed Mack’s motion for summary judgment. On June 11, oral argument was heard before the Federal Court.
Under federal law, summary judgment is appropriate when, based upon the record, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The standard of proof for causation in asbestos cases is modified from that in a typical tort action to reflect the inherent difficulties associated with proving causation for prolonged latent diseases like mesothelioma or asbestosis. To prove causation in an asbestos case in Massachusetts, a plaintiff must establish three elements: “(1) that the defendant’s product contained asbestos (product identification), (2) that the victim was exposed to the asbestos in the defendant’s product (exposure), and (3) that such exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing harm to the victim (substantial factor)… If evidence of any element is deficient, summary judgment would be appropriate.”
In the case at bar, the Federal Court agreed with Mack’s arguments in its motion for summary judgment. At the outset, the court found Mr. Wright claimed exposure to Mack’s asbestos containing clutches during his work as a mechanic with A.J. Letourneau Trucking between 1990 and 1994 or at Lily Transportation between 1996 and 1998. However, Mack provided definitive proof demonstrating Mack’s clutch facings were asbestos-free by the end of 1982. This was approximately seven to eight years before Mr. Wright’s first exposure to Mack’s asbestos-containing products. In addition, plaintiff is claiming exposure to Mack’s asbestos-containing brakes while employed as a mechanic with Package Industries from approximately 1986 to 1987 and A.J. Letourneau Trucking from approximately 1990 to 1994. Mack’s opposition proffered evidence showing Mack Trucks no longer had any asbestos-containing brakes by the end of 1989. Plaintiffs attempt to create a genuine dispute of a material fact about the date by which Mack’s brakes were asbestos-free by citing to testimony in a 2011 lawsuit was not persuasive as Mack’s corporate representative took an “educated guess” as to the exact date. Although it is not disputed that Mr. Wright used Mack products while performing brake work at A.J. Letourneau, the court maintained it is unlikely those components contained asbestos as Mr. Wright’s work occurred at least several months, and more likely, years after Mack ceased using asbestos-containing brake products.
The final inquiry was whether Mr. Wright was exposed to Mack’s asbestos-containing gaskets. Mr. Wright performed gasket work on Mack trucks at both Package Industries in 1986 and at A.J. Letourneau Trucking from 1990 to 1994. The evidence related to Mr. Wright’s work at A.J. Letourneau was impermissible speculation since Mr. Wright could not recall whether the gaskets removed or installed were produced by a Mack or a third-party. As such, this testimony was impermissible speculation and therefore did not establish product identification. The court found Mr. Wright performed gasket work twice while at Package Industries in 1986. Mack concedes to selling asbestos-containing gaskets during that time. While sufficient to establish product identification, plaintiffs do not cite any evidence in the record suggesting that Mack did not provide such a warning or argue that the warning was insufficient. Consequently, the court found such unsupported allegations were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Next, the Federal Court determined whether plaintiffs have satisfied the exposure element. Whereas the first element of causation deals with the fact of exposure to an asbestos-containing product, the second element deals with the requisite degree of exposure. To satisfy the second element of causation, “the plaintiff must produce evidence of a degree of exposure greater than ‘insignificant or de minimis.” Although the burden of proof is low, it must not fall to a level of speculation. “The exposure must be ‘more than just casual or minimum exposure.’ A triable question of liability requires more than a minimal speculative possibility that the victim took a single breath of particles from the product of the charged defendant.”
Here, the Federal Court found that although plaintiffs present evidence concerning the emanation of asbestos fibers during the removal of a worn asbestos gasket, they present no evidence concerning exposure during the installation of a new gasket. The only evidence concerning exposure to asbestos from installing a new friction product relates to the installation of brake linings, and plaintiffs present no argument how those two processes might be comparable. Thus, while plaintiffs have presented evidence that Mr. Wright may have installed one of Mack’s asbestos-containing gaskets, there is no evidence whatsoever that he was exposed to the asbestos contained therein. As a result, plaintiffs have presented insufficient evidence to survive summary judgement for Mack as to the negligence, breach of express and implied warranty claim, and failure to warn and defective design claims, alleged by plaintiffs in this action.
Lastly, the Federal Court determined Mrs. Wright’s loss of consortium claim. The Federal Courts have consistently maintained that a loss of consortium claims is a derivative claim that can only be asserted if at least one of the underlying personal injury claims survive. In the instant matter, the Federal Court had already determined to grant Mack summary judgment on the underlying personal injury claims. As such, Mack’s motion for summary judgment as to Mrs. Wright’s loss of consortium claim was also granted as a matter of law. In view of the above, the Federal Court granted Mack’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, whereby dismissing all claims alleged by plaintiffs’ complaint against Mack as a matter of law.
Read the full decision here.